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Competition policy works well when markets are given time to evolve and drive improved 
efficiency;  but  this  takes  time.  However,  under  current  turbulent  times,  the  short-run 
survival actions may be insistently sought by policy-makers under the pressure of trade 
unions  and  the  exit  of  failing  firms  may  be  perceived  to  be  more  costly  for  society. 
Actually, the immediate costs that existing businesses, employees and consumers have to 
incur may be up-front and visible, while the benefits of competition may be less visible. 
As  a  consequence,  times  of  severe  financial  and  economic  crises  bring  about  a  severe 
questioning  of  market  mechanisms  with  unfailing  regularity  and  the  stance  of  the 
competition policy against this backdrop. 
We shall therefore look in the current paper at the role of competition authorities in a time 
of severe economic and financial crisis and in particular, at how the crisis will impact the 
application  of  competition  law.  In  the  end,  we  will  conclude  in  favour  of  the  need  to 
preserve  competition  policy  as  well  in  difficult  times  even  if  we  admit  that  a  certain 
flexibilisation in procedures (but not in rules) may be probably necessary. 
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Introduction 
The crisis arose in the US financial sector, one of the most developed of the world and 
grew, on the one hand, because prudential regulation did not prevent banks from taking 
excessive risks and, on the other hand, because the asset valuation method had magnifying 
effects which weakened the banking sector in a period of rapid decline in the value of 
financial assets, the result of which was to worsen the systemic risk that the sector was 
facing. Actually, dangerous incentives leading to moral hazard, asymmetry of information, 
and poor regulation were the main reasons of this crisis.
1  
Unlike what happens in most goods and services markets, where a firm’s failure represents 
an opportunity for its rivals, the failure of a firm in the banking and financial sector is liable 
to  have  systemic  effects  in  the  banking  system  as  a  whole.  Indeed,  the  experience  of 
Lehman Brothers has shown that the uncontrolled disappearance of players with a flawed 
business model may effectively hurt the remaining banks.  
 
1. Lessons from history
2 
In considering possible responses to the economic crisis, the world is not writing on a blank 
slate.  In the not-so-distant past, a major financial institution failed. The existing regulatory 
structure proved inadequate to solve the problem. Public confidence in the financial system 
fell, and the system itself was in danger of collapse. A major financial firm found itself in 
financial distress, largely because of the imminent failure of an industrial firm it controlled. 
At  the  last  moment,  however,  the  dominant  competitor  of  the  industrial  firm  stepped 
forward and offered to buy it, which would in turn have saved the financial firm. 
There was only one obstacle: because the bailout might have resulted in the creation of a 
monopoly at the level of the industrial firm, the engineers of the rescue faced the threat of 
enforcement  of  the  competition  law  against  the  bailout.  To  this,  the  would-be  rescuers 
argued that the financial crisis constituted an emergency that justified subordination of the 
competition law to the greater interest in protecting jobs. 
While this scenario might be thought to refer to the present day, in fact it describes the 
American financial panic of 1907, which took place only 17 years after US first antitrust 
law  was  passed.
3  The  dominant  industrial  firm  was  United  States  Steel,  which  was 
controlled by the industrialist J.P. Morgan. A major investment house was about to fail, and 
it held stock in a failing coal company. Morgan’s solution was for U.S. Steel to buy the coal 
company,  which  would  in  turn  save  the  investment  house  (as  well,  perhaps,  as 
strengthening  U.S.  Steel’s  own  position  given  its  own  interests  in  the  coal  business). 
Morgan sent his emissaries to meet with then-President Theodore Roosevelt, bypassing the 
Department of Justice, which at the time was the sole enforcer of the antitrust law.
4  They 
                                                 
1 OECD Financial Market Trends, The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues, 2008. 
2 The discussion in this chapter draws heavily from Winerman, M.,  Antitrust and the United States 
Financial Crisis of ’07, The Antitrust Source (2008),  available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
source/08/12/Dec08-FullSource12-22f.pdf.  
3 Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1-2. 
4 The Federal Trade Commission would not be created until 1914. Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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persuaded Roosevelt that the greater industrial policy goal of saving the financial system 
justified the merger, and Roosevelt personally approved the deal.
5 
So what happened? It turned out that the failing coal company in fact produced a type of 
coal that was especially well-suited to a new technology that was coming on line – and U.S. 
Steel now controlled it. Whether the deal was in fact anticompetitive is unknown, but as 
there had been no investigation, there was never an opportunity to consider this fact. A few 
years later, the Justice Department under the next President tried to challenge the deal as 
part of a broader challenge to U.S. Steel. When the case reached the Supreme Court some 
years later, the Court rebuffed the challenge, partly on the grounds that President Roosevelt 
had approved it.
6 Because of US common law system, in which Supreme Court precedents 
become incorporated into the law, that precedent may have made it harder to challenge 
mergers.  That, in turn,  may have contributed to the wave of concentration that took place 
in the 1920s.
7 
One need only move the clock forward to the next economic crisis, the Great Depression of 
1929, to find out whether anything had been learned from this experience. In 1933, another 
President Roosevelt (Franklin) took office and tried to stem that crisis. Some measures 
seemed to help, such as enacting securities regulation. But Roosevelt also persuaded the 
Congress  to  pass  the  National  Industrial  Recovery  Act.
8  This  law  essentially  legalized 
cartels  and  suspended  enforcement  of  American  antitrust  law.  It  authorized  firms  to 
establish  “industrial  codes”  that  were  subject  to  nominal  government  review  and  were 
enforceable by the government.  Armed with this new authority, industries did about what 
might have been expected: they established cartels that restrained price and constrained 
output, all justified in the name of preventing “disruptive” and “wasteful” competition. The 
very language of commerce changed – discounters were called “chiselers,” a pejorative 
term in English. 
The  effect  of  the  NIRA  has  been  well  documented.    The  current  Chairman  of  the  US 
President’s  Council  of  Economic  Advisors  wrote,  while  an  academic,  that  “the  more 
important effect of the NIRA was to diminish the responsiveness of price changes to the 
deviation  of  output  from  the  trend.  .  .  .  It  prevented  the  economy’s  self-correction 
mechanism from working. Thus, the NIRA can be best thought of as a force holding back 
recovery.”
9 One academic found that output was depressed by 10% due to the NIRA.
10 In 
the end, the NIRA made the depression longer and more severe than it would otherwise 
have been.
11 
                                                 
5 It is highly unusual for the President to become personally involved with the direct enforcement of 
the antitrust laws, which is normally left to the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.  
6 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 446–47 (1920). 
7 William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman 
Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1112, 1115–16 (1989). 
8 Act of June 16, 1933, Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (formerly codified at 15 U.S.C. § 703), 
9 Christina Romer, “Why Did Prices Rise During the 1930s?” Journal of Economic History, 59(1), 
167-199, p. 197. 
10  Jason  Taylor,  “The  Output  Effects  of  Government  Sponsored  Cartels  During  the  New  Deal,” 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 50, 1-10 (2002). 
11  Shapiro,  C.,  Deputy  Assistant  Attorney  General  for  Economics,  U.S.  Department  of 
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Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court declared the NIRA unconstitutional in 1935.  
By  then,  Roosevelt  had  realized  that  it  had  been  a  bad  idea.  He  changed  course  and 
appointed  strong  antitrust  enforcers,  who  began  to  resume  enforcement  of  the  antitrust 
laws. The climate that led to the passage of NIRA, which favored protecting firms from 
competition, had other effects that were not so easy to eliminate. We’ll give two examples. 
The airline industry in the United States, which was in its adolescence if not still in infancy, 
had  originally  been  dependent  on  airmail  subsidies  to  survive.  By  the  1930s,  new 
technology had led the industry to the point where airlines could begin to make a profit 
carrying passengers. And indeed, some innovative new carriers began to move into the 
market to compete with the holders of the airmail contracts.  One, for example, offered the 
innovative idea of flying hourly between New York and Washington, much to the distress 
of the airmail contract holder which served the route only as part of longer routes from New 
York  to  the  south.
12  At  the  request  of  the  incumbent  airlines,  which  claimed  to  need 
protection from harmful competition, Congress enacted a pervasive regulatory scheme in 
1938 that regulated entry, price, and routes. While airlines could still compete on the basis 
of food service and schedules, they had no reason to fear entry or price competition. 
At the same time, as US highway system  was becoming better, trucking emerged as a 
viable competitor to the railroads. The railroad industry had long been regulated by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, at first to protect the interest of farmers, shippers, and 
passengers.  Eventually,  it  seemed  to  be  more  concerned  with  protecting  the  railroads 
themselves. At the behest of the railroads, the ICC was charged with regulating the trucking 
industry. Routes were fixed, so that if a trucking route held a route from New York to 
Florida and another from Florida to Chicago, it could only haul freight from New York to 
Chicago  via  Florida.  Manufacturers  and  sellers  began  setting  up  their  own  trucking 
operations, but their trucks had to return home empty. Rates were also fixed. The system 
was grossly inefficient, and since transportation is a major component of the price of many 
goods, the costs were often paid by the consumer.
13 
While the Depression ended with World War II, these regulatory schemes persisted until 
the 1980s, by which time the “infant” airline industry was flying 747s. Eventually both 
industries were deregulated. Costs came down and innovative new entrants came into the 
market.
14 The lessons to be learned are that a regulatory response intended to provide a 
respite  from  market  forces  in  response  to  a  short-term  economic  crisis  is  unlikely  to 
succeed,  produce  unanticipated  counterproductive  results,  and  can  give  incumbents  and 
opportunity to entrench themselves in ways that will take decades to reverse. 
Moving to the present, the pertinent issue is how these issues are being addressed. What 
have  we  learned  from  previous  similar  situations?  How  are  authorities  responding  to 
current challenges? These are the questions we will try to address in the following parts. 
                                                                                                                            
Bar  Association  Antitrust  Symposium  (May  13,  2009),  available  at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm. 
12 Van der Linden, R.F., Airlines And Air Mail: The Post Office and the Birth of the Commercial 
Aviation Industry, 192-95 (Univ. Press of Ky. 2002).   
13 Trucking Deregulation in the United States, Submission by the United States to the Ibero-American 
Competition Forum, September, 2007, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/ibero-
trucking.pdf . 
14 Robert Crandall and Jerome Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice, 34-47. Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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2. Addressing the current financial crisis 
After  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers,  many  governments  around  the  world  promptly 
intervened in order to secure the short-term viability of their financial system by means of 
guarantees, recapitalization measures and urgent implementation of mergers on claims of 
national security or ‘systemic risk’. 
The more recent reactions of Europe and US to the credit crunch constitute examples of 
government interventions into economy and subsequently, challenges for competition law 
and  policy.  For  instance,  the  UK  government  permitted,  without  consulting  with  its 
competition authority, the merger of Lloyds and HBOS
15, a merger which would not have 
probably passed otherwise the competition test. In Ireland, limitation of state guarantees by 
the Irish government only to the six national banks led to a massive withdrawal by the 
depositors of the accounts in Great Britain or in the Irish banks. 
More recently, in the US, the government intervention for saving AIG insurance company 
from  financial  collapse  already  proves  the  negative  effects  of  applying  a  selective 
protectionist policy. Thus, the rivals of AIG Company have already expressed publicly their 
discontent with the fact that immediately after receiving a financial aid of 173.3 billion 
dollars, the company began  to apply an aggressive policy of cutting the  fees for some 
services in its portfolio, causing a fall in prices of more than 30%
16. Further, the chain of 
mergers facilitated by the US treasury will leave the US with highly concentrated financial 
markets
17.  
However,  completing  financial  sector  repair  and  reforming  prudential  frameworks  are 
indispensable for a return to sustained growth. A key to a resumption of normal lending is 
the restructuring of the financial firms’activities. As explained in more depth in the October 
2009 IMF Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR), it definitely requires the adoption of 
long-term  viability  measures  such  as  balance  sheet  cleansing,  deep  restructuring  in 
individual banks, new business plans and new prudential frameworks.   
 
3. Addressing the current economic crisis 
The financial crisis that initially affected the banking sector has in turn had an impact on 
the real economy. The world entered its first collective economic recession since World 
War II. The IMF GFSR suggested in October 2009 that while global GDP will contract by 
about 1 percent in 2009, global activity is forecast to expand by about 3 percent in 2010, 
which is well below the rates achieved before the crisis. Of the world’s major economies, 
only China and India will register GDP increases this year. These projections reflect modest 
upward revisions to those in the July 2009 WEO Update presented below in table no. 1. 
                                                 
15  Great Britain, OFT statement on proposed merger between Lloyds TSB and HBOS, Press release 
108-08, 2008, September 18. 
16 USA Inc: AIG’s Rivals blame bailout for tilting insurance game, Wall Street Journal, 2009, March, 
23. 
17 See Degryse and  Ongena, who in Competition and Regulation in the Banking Sector: A Review of 
the Empirical Evidence on the sources of bank rents, published in A. Thakor and A. Boot (eds.), 
Handbook of Financial Intermediation and Banking, Elsevier, assess the whole literature with respect 
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Table no. 1: 2009 Real GDP Growth 
2009 Real GDP Growth  2009  2010 
World  -1.4  2.5 
Advanced economies  -3.8  0.6 
Emerging and developing economies  1.5  4.7 
Developing Asia  5.5  7.0 
Africa  1.8  4.1 
Central and Eastern Europe  -5.0  1.0 
Commonwealth of Independent States  -5.8  2.0 
US  -2.6  0.8 
Germany  -6.2  -0.6 
France  -3.0  0.4 
Italy  -5.1  -0.1 
Spain  -4.0  -0.8 
Japan  -6.0  -1.7 
UK  -4.2  0.2 
Canada  -2.3  1.6 
Russia  -6.5  1.5 
China  7.5  8.5 
India  5.4  6.5 
Brazil  -1.3  2.5 
Mexico  -7.3  3.0 
Source: World Economic Outlook Update, IMF, July 2009. Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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However, the same IMF GFSR concludes in optimistic terms that “after a deep global 
recession, economic growth has turned positive, as wide-ranging public intervention has 
supported demand and lowered uncertainty and systemic risk in financial markets. The 
recovery is expected to be slow, as financial systems remain impaired, support from public 
policies will gradually have to be withdrawn, and households in economies that suffered 
asset price busts will continue to rebuild savings while struggling with high unemployment. 
The key policy requirements remain to restore financial sector health while maintaining 
supportive  macroeconomic  policies  until  the  recovery  is  on  a  firm  footing.  However, 




4. Role of competition policy protection 
While the 1990s and the early 2000s saw competition law acquiring growing power to 
shape the economic activity worldwide, it is now clear that government intervention and 
regulation – more intrusive than competition law – on which hopes for economic recovery 
and a return to prosperity are now pinned. Therefore, this dire financial and economic 
situation poses significant challenges for competition policy. 
Usually, competition protection policy has positive microeconomic effects that translate 
into  lower  prices,  higher  output,  more  alternatives  for  the  consumers,  and  increased 
innovation. However, there are opinions arguing that it may have as well macroeconomic 
effects, mainly influencing stock markets and business cycle. Thus, tough antitrust policy 
may somehow explain lower level of investments during certain periods in the past. But 
this does not mean that competition policy is one of the reasons for the current economic 
and financial crisis. 
As shown above, history abounds in evidence providing that relaxing or sometimes even 
suspending  competition  rules,  whether  in  State  aid  or  merger  area,  would  have  major 
negative  macroeconomic  consequences,  because  it  would  harm  consumers,  impede  the 
manifestation of competition on the merits by keeping inefficient companies in business 
and ultimately delay the recovery.  
The relaxation of the merger control policy during previous economic crises was clearly 
directed towards promoting protectionist policies and consisted either in allowing otherwise 
anti-competitive  mergers  between  domestic  entities  or  into  prohibiting  otherwise  pro-
competitive acquisitions of domestic entities by foreign entities
19. 
Moreover, there is another risk  which cannot be  underestimated, that in the context of 
market globalization, the protection of national players and interests by state loans and 
guarantees might lead to a race among different states for subsidizing their industries. One 
example when such claims for protection were evident is the Chrysler case in 1980. 
At that time, Chrysler’s financial difficulties were caused mainly by the fact that it did not 
respond promptly enough to the consumers’ demands for smaller and low fuel consumption 
cars. Chrysler, which was on the verge of bankruptcy, received US$ 1.2 billion as federal 
                                                 
18 World Economic Outlook Outdate, Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, October 2009. 
19  Elena  Carletti,  European  University  Institute,  Background  Note  on  Competition  and  Financial 




729                                                                                                             Amfiteatru Economic 
guarantees  of  the  loan.  G.  William  Miller,  Governor  of  the  Treasury  at  the  time  these 
guarantees were granted, said that “there is a public interest for saving these jobs and a 
competitive national car industry”
20. At his turn, Lee Iacocca, Chrysler’s president, claimed 
that “governmental guarantees, import quotas  and a well-defined industrial policy will be 
the key to success for American corporations in years to come”.
21 On the contrary, Alfred 
Dougherty, Jr., Director of the Competition Bureau of the Federal Trade Commission at 
that time, declared before the American Senate: “When a company has misperceived or 
been unable to satisfy the needs and preferences of the consumer, there are little reason 
should normally exist to preserve the firm through artificial support. Rather, the opposite is 
generally  true.  The  failure  of  the  firm  increases  allocative  efficiency  by  removing  an 
inefficient user of economic resources.”
22 
The federal guarantees such as those granted to Chrysler in 1980 had the effect of crowding 
out private investments and therefore loans for other companies as well as for individuals in 
the credit market became more expensive and more difficult to obtain. If Chrysler had been 
pushed  into  bankruptcy,  the  resources  controlled  by  the  corporation  could  have  been 
directed to other more efficient players in the car market or outside it. Although job losses 
caused by Chrysler’s potential bankruptcy were estimated to over 720,000
23, in fact, the 
federal bailout of Chrysler saved only part of these jobs in the short run. 
 
5. How to ensure an effective and coherent public response to the crisis? 
Everybody agrees that “the economy can not get back to sustainable growth until the banks 
were  back  in  order.”
24  So,  in  a  first  stage,  all  governments  worldwide  struggled  for 
restoring the stability of their financial systems by taking short-term and long-term viability 
measures. In a second stage, there is a need for taking appropriate measures to deal with the 
economic crisis. A first set of measures refer to the “classical” tools that governments may 
use, i.e. fiscal and monetary policies. The second one refers to methods involving state aid, 
under  various  forms  and  a  certain  relaxation  of  the  competition  policy,  mainly  merger 
control. Since the aim of this paper is to find out whether competition policy will lose its 
major role in market regulation or not under current environment in disorder, we shall focus 





                                                 
20 Chrysler’s Crisis Bailout, Time Magazine (August 20, 1979). 
21 Hickel, James K., The Chrysler Bail-Out Bust, Backgrounder 276 (1983, July, 13, p. 1). 
22  Statement  of  Alfred  F.  Dougherty,  Jr.,  Director,  Bureau  of  Competition,  Federal  Trade 
Commission, before the American Senate concerning Government Assistance to Chrysler Corporation  
(October 10, 1979, p.2). 
23 Ibidem note 13. 
24 Commissioner Nellie Kroes, Address at OECD Forum: "The Crisis and Beyond: For a Stronger, 
Cleaner, Fairer Economy", Paris , 23rd June 2009. Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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“The failing firm defense”doctrine and the EU merger control policy”  
In  the  context  of  the  financial  crisis,  rescue  mergers  between  banks  as  well  as 
nationalization of banks by Member States
25  have given rise to new challenges in the 
application of merger control rules, in terms of both procedural and substantive aspects.  
At  first  sight,  it  seems  that  the  tight  deadlines  characterizing  the  review  of  economic 
concentrations by the competition authorities would impede the quick implementation of 
mergers or acquisitions that sometimes may be required to keep a troubled firm operating. 
However, the procedural rules regarding mergers may be adapted when necessary to ensure 
that merger control enforcement would be an adequate and flexible instrument also in times 
of crisis.  
However, so far, adapting the procedural rules governing merger control to the current 
economic framework has not been required at EU level. 
From the viewpoint of the substantive aspects of merger control,  under EC antitrust law, 
merging companies may avail themselves of the “failing firm” defence doctrine. When, 
absent a merger, one of the merging parties would very likely fail, the merger may be found 
not to violate article 7 of the EC Merger Regulation no. 139/2004
26.  This argument plays 
an important role in competition policy by ensuring that merger law does not unnecessarily 
lead  to  assets  exiting  a  relevant  market.    Its  application,  however,  is  narrow  because 
merging parties bear the burden of proof that there is no alternative purchaser that would 
create a less anticompetitive effect.  
Moreover, in an economic slowdown, more and more companies can become bankrupt 
making the “failing firm defense” argument more and more frequently invoked. As a result, 
one should not neglect the real reasons behind the greater number of failing firms in times 
of economic crisis.   
As  a  consequence,  the  present  challenges  do  not  justify  the  temporary  relaxation  or 
suspension of the present rules on economic concentrations. In addition, the procedural 
rules  in  the  field  together  with  an  increased  vigilance  of  the  competition  authorities 
guarantee an efficient enforcement of merger control and in a way that should support the 
economic recovery of the companies under difficulties. 
 
EU State aids – part of the solution? 
EU  competition  policy  not  only  enables  the  EC  to  act  firmly  against  distortions  of 
competition caused by the conduct of companies. It can also effectively control the impact 
of  State  interventions  on  competition  by  ensuring  that  a  State  subsidy  does  not  create 
disproportionate and unnecessary distortions of competition.  
The  objective  of  State  aid  control  in  the  EU  is  therefore  to  ensure  that  government 
interventions do not distort competition and intra-community trade. 
                                                 
25 To be noted that US did not nationalize banks even during the Great Depression of 1929. However, 
nowadays,  more  and  more  voices  claim  that  nationalizing  banks  would  be  the  last  solution  for 
reviving US financial institutions, according to the Swedish model in the 90’s. 
26  See  the  EC  Notice-Guidelines  on  the  assessment  of  horizontal  mergers  under  the  Council 
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The Member States of the European Union (EU) can grant state aids either in the context of 
the  existing  rules  and  regulations  or  by  enforcing  the  temporary  framework  that  the 
European Commission (EC) has introduced in order to address the current situation in the 
real economy and the financial sector. 
The general rule is that state aid is prohibited. However, there are exceptions from this 
general rule for specific policy objectives, in the case of which state aid is considered to be 
compatible: aid for small and medium-sized enterprises, training aid, regional aid, aid for 
environment, research and development aid, aid for rescue and restructuring, etc. However, 
the authorisation of these exemptions rests exclusively with the EC which has to be notified 
(except in certain instances) and to give its approval for an aid measure to be implemented 
by a Member State.  
In order to facilitate the relationship between competition policy and public intervention, 
EC adopted in October 2008 a Communication showing the way in which state aid rules 
apply to the measures taken in support of  financial institutions in the context of the current 
global crisis (Banking communication).
27 Thus, banks in difficulty have been granted cash 
or state guarantees for a limited period of time in order to keep them afloat.  
Later on, however, when the crisis spread into the whole financial system as a result of the 
freeze in interbank lending, i.e., since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the Commission 
complemented the banking guidance document of 13 October that created the framework 
for rescue operations by issuing a communication on how Member States can recapitalise 
banks  in  order  to  boost  credit  flows  to  the  real  economy  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
Community  state  aid  rules  (Recapitalisation  Communication).  Another  important  EC 
decision targeting the financial sector consisted in setting up the framework that would 
allow Member States to clean-up balance sheets (Impaired Asset Communication). 
However, at the community level, limiting competition distortions is vital in this sector just 
as in other sectors and, thus, the rescued banks which benefited from guarantee schemes, 
restructuring  packages  and  other  measures  must  provide  restructuring  plans  and  prove 
transparency by informing the European Commission with regard to the toxic assets. These 
restructuring plans aim to restore the long-term viability, to limit State aid to the minimum 
necessary (the private participation in covering restructuring costs) and to introduce certain 
compensatory  measures  in  order  to  limit  competition  distortions  and  extracting  market 
shares from viable banks.  
Under current exceptional circumstances, the European Commission approved the aid plans 
to  bail  out  the  banks  through  capitalization,  state  guarantees,  rescue  and  restructuring 
packages and other measures put in place by several Member States
28 such as Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, France, Finland, Sweeden, Italy, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Ireland 
and the UK. 
For instance, Germany granted liquidity facilities to Sachsen LB
29, Hypo Real Estate
30 and 
a risk shield to IKB
31 without which those banks would not have been able to continue their 
                                                 
27 EC Communication on the application of state aid rules in the sector of financial institutions in the 
context of the global financial crisis, OJ C 270/02/2008, 25.10.2008. 
28 State Aid Scoreboard, Spring 2009 Update, 08.04.2009, Brussels, COM(2009) 164. 
29 Case C9/2008, Restructuring aid to Sachsen LB (decision 4.6.2008). Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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business.  However,  tough  compensatory  measures,  such  as  selling  or  liquidating 
subsidiaries,  abandoning  proprietary  trading  and  international  real  estate  activities, 
significant  own  contribution,  i.e.  above  50  %  of  the  restructuring  costs  –  have  been 
associated.  
In the case of WestLB
32, the restructuring plan provided that the bank would entirely stop 
certain risky business activities, e.g. proprietary trading, thereby reducing its assets by 50%. 
Finally, Germany committed to change the bank's ownership structure through a public 
tender procedure before the end of 2011.
33  
At its turn, UK provided guarantees to Northern Rock which have been approved as rescue 
aid by the Commission
34 in December 2007. UK has subsequently notified a restructuring 
aid to the bank and the Commission opened a formal investigation. At the time of the 
writing, the case is still under assessment.
35  
UK mortgage bank Bradford and Bingley
36 got as well financial aid from the government, 
under  similar  conditionalities,  like  commitments  to  present  restructuring  plans,  scaling 
down of its activities or selling of assets.  
Commission  also  approved  a  rescue  aid  provided  by  Denmark  to  Roskilde  Bank.
37 
However, the aid did not take effect and Denmark decided to liquidate the bank in an 
orderly manner and granting full creditor protection.  
In  the  particular  case  of  Romania,  no  specific  decision  has  been  made  to  support  the 
financial system. However, no bank in Romania registered financial problems. As part of 
its anti-crisis package of  measures, the Romanian Government intended to increase the 
capital of its state-owned bank CEC, aiming at stimulating lending for SMEs. However, the 
recapitalization of the State-controlled CEC bank was deemed by the EC as a form of state 
aid  if  the  Romanian  government  can  not  prove  that  it  is  acting  like  a  prudent  private 
investor. Moreover, it seems that it would have been much easier to get the approval if the 
bank would have been in difficulty. But this was not the case of CEC Bank. 
Examples above show that making use, in particular, of the exemption allowed for rescue 
and  restructuring,  various  EU  Member  States  provided  support,  in  particular  to  their 
financial systems in the current crises, but the conditions attached to those grants have been 
severe and have had as a main objective not to distort competition on the markets.  
Overall, the total volume of crisis measures approved by the Commission in EU for the 
financial system up to end-March 2009 was about € 3,000 billion, i.e. around 24% of the 
EU  GDP
38.  This  figure  represents  the  amount  of  guarantee  umbrellas,  rescue  and 
restructuring packages and other measures. The amount of state aids will depend on the 
actual implementation of the measures. The schemes approved are under constant review in 
order to terminate them when the economic situation will improve.  
                                                                                                                            
30 Case NN44/2008, Rescue aid to Hypo Real Estate (decision 2.10.2008). 
31 Case C10/2008, Restructuring aid to IKB (decision 21.10.2008). 
32 Case C43/2008, WestLB risk shield. 
33 European Commission, IP/09/741. 
34 Case NN70/2007, Northern Rock (decision 5.12.2007). 
35 Case C14/2008, Restructuring aid to Northern Rock (under assessment). 
36 Case NN41/2008, Rescue aid to Bradford & Bingley (decision 1.10.2008). 
37 Case NN36/2008, Roskilde Bank (decision 31.7.2008). 
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In the context of its European economic recovery plan, the Commission adopted as well a 
temporary framework providing Member States with additional ways of tackling the effects 
of the credit squeeze on the real economy. This new framework introduced a number of 
temporary measures to allow Member States to address companies’ exceptional difficulties 
in obtaining finance. In particular, EU Member States including Romania are able to grant, 
without  notification  of  individual  cases,  subsidised  loans,  loan  guarantees  at  a  reduced 
premium, risk capital  for SMEs and direct aids of up  to EUR 500,000. These aids  are 
allowed until the end of 2010 and may be granted to firms which were not in difficulty on 
1
st of July 2008, but entered into difficulty thereafter. In other words, it is presumed that 
these firms are in difficulty not because their business model is wrong, but because they are 
affected by the global financial and economic crises. 
 
Conclusions 
The lesson coming from past experience  should be clear. As one specialist recently said, 
“Keeping markets competitive is no less important during times of economic hardship than 
during normal times.”
39 This is like driving on a highway. While it is important to drive 
safely on a beautiful day, it is even more important to follow the safety laws when it’s icy, 
dark and raining, because that’s when the bad things are most likely to happen. 
This paper does not attack the idea of regulation. This is not the case, as regulation certainly 
has its place. In air transportation, for example, nobody argues with the idea of regulating 
safety. But regulation can go too far when it is employed only to exclude competition, 
which is typically justified in the interest of promoting “stability,” “competitiveness,” or 
other industrial policy goals. The trick, of course, is to find the right balance by weighing 
the cost of regulation against the benefits. 
Why is this hard? It’s hard because economic crisis creates an opportunity for those who 
would exclude competition to claim that the emergency situation justifies brushing aside 
sound competition principles with only the slightest glance, as Theodore Roosevelt did in 
1907, and as US Congress did in the 1930s  when it regulated the airline and trucking 
industries. 
The important point is that the legitimate purpose of regulation must be carefully balanced 
with its impact on the functioning of competitive markets. We must recognize that those 
who  would exclude competition  will be quick enough to propose regulation that could 
bring benefits to them at the expense of consumers and will try to justify it on the basis of 
economic crisis without taking the trouble to measure the true costs and benefits. 
On the other hand, examples in this article clearly reveal that the state support for the 
financial sector and real economy is massive. They also show that the largest interventions 
are made by the largest and strongest economies. Weaker or smaller economies can not 
afford such size of intervention. 
                                                 
39 Carl Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, U.S. Department of Justice, “Competition 
Policy  in  Distressed  Industries,”  Remarks  Prepared  for  Delivery  to  American  Bar  Association  Antitrust 
Symposium (May 13, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/245857.htm. Economic Policy in the Wake of the Crisis  AE 
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So moving the clock forward again to 2009, we have another economic crisis. Have we 
learned our lesson this time? Both in EU and US, as well as in many other countries allover 
the world, committed antitrust enforcers are trying to maintain an undistorted competition 
in the markets. However, calls for the application of industrial policy are likely to persist, 
and competition authorities have to be vigilant in the years to come. The experience has 
been that these calls must be met with well reasoned arguments in favor of competition. 
While regulation may well be appropriate where the benefits of regulation exceed  its costs, 
that does not justify casting aside what we have learned about the benefits of competition. 
Therefore, an increased and well functioning dialogue between the competition authorities, 
financial regulators and other public authorities, leading maybe to a certain flexibilisation 
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